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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- COMMENTARY THAT BINDS: THE
INCREASED POWER OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
IN LIGHT OF Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.
Bishop Hoadley'
Under fire for the ineffectiveness of the federal criminal justice
system, Congress set out in 1984 to revamp the federal sentencing
scheme. To accomplish this, Congress designated the United States
Sentencing Commission ("Commission") as the guiding force in the
fight against crime. To execute the task, Congress directed the
Commssion to establish sentencing guidelines that all federal judges
would use in sentencing offenders, in the hope of creating a system
in which similar offenses would receive similar punishment. However,
questions eventually arose regarding the constitutionality of this new
scheme, forcing the Supreme Court to resolve the constitutional
legitimacy of the Commission and its function.2 Though the questions
surrounding the guidelines may have subsided in the wake of Mistretta
v. United States, new questions and controversies may soon be on
the horizon.
In Stinson v. United States,3 the United States Supreme Court
examined the question of whether commentary to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines ("guidelines") is binding on federal courts.'
At his sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Stinson under
the career offender guidelines,5 concluding that his conviction for
1. Reprinted in WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: How TO USE
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 28 (1975).
2. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
3. 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).
4. Id. at 1915.
5. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 4B1.l-4BI.2 (Nov. 1992) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.J. Under Section 4Bl.1, the de-
fendant must be assigned a category VI, the highest criminal history category in
the sentencing scheme. Id. at § 4B1.1.
In Stinson's case, the district court determined that his adjusted base offense
level was 35. Brief for the Respondent at 4, Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
1913 (1993) (No. 91-8685) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Coupled with a criminal
history category of VI, the sentencing range was 292 to 365 months. U.S.S.G.
§ 5A (sentencing table). The district court sentenced Stinson to the maximum 365
months imprisonment. United States v. Stinson, 943 F.2d 1268, 1269 (11th Cir.
1991).
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possession of a firearm by a felon constituted a "crime of violence." '6
After the decision was affirmed on appeal, the Commission
amended the commentary to the career offender guidelines to indicate
that possession of a firearm by a felon was not a "crime of
violence." 7 Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit denied Stinson's petition for a rehearing, holding
that commentary to the guidelines is not binding on federal courts.8
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit. 9
This note will examine the sentencing scheme prior to the en-
actment of the guidelines and the shortcomings which ultimately led
to the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission. The
note then will scrutinize the structure and methods of the Commission
and the ways in which its activities directly affect the federal criminal
justice system. Finally, this note will consider the practical effect
of the Court's holding in Stinson. While Congress envisioned that
the Commission would have primary responsibility for the devel-
opment and adjustment of the guidelines, it was intended to be with
Congressional oversight. However, since changes in commentary are
not subject to Congressional review, the holding in Stinson provides
the Commission with a means by which to circumvent Congressional
review and with powers which arguably exceed the scope of Con-
gress's original intent.
II. FACTS
On October 31, 1989, Terry Lynn Stinson entered the Sun Bank
of Jacksonville, Florida, holding a hand grenade and a sawed-off
shotgun.' 0 Confronting a bank employee he demanded, "Give me
the money or I'll throw this in your lap. Hang up the phone and
give me the money now."" The employee put the money into a
plastic bag while Stinson pointed the sawed-off shotgun at her. 2
6. Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1269.
7. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. 2.
8. United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 814 (lth Cir. 1992).
9. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915.
10. Respondent's Brief at 2. Prior to the robbery, Stinson placed a pipe bomb
in a local McDonald's in order to create a diversion. Telephone Interview with
Ronald T. Henry, Assistant United States Attorney for the Middle District of
Florida (Sept. 16, 1993). The diversion was successful, even though the bomb did
not explode, since numerous police officers and members of the bomb squad were
quickly dispatched to the McDonald's, thus increasing Stinson's chances of escaping.
Id.
11. Respondent's Brief at 2.
12. Id.
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After taking the money, Stinson ordered everyone to lie on the
floor, threw the hand grenade onto the floor, and escaped with
$9,427 in cash. 3 Stinson fled the scene in a pickup truck, which
police later found abandoned near his apartment. 4 Stinson continued
his flight in a van that he had stolen from a car dealership earlier
in the day." He subsequently drove to Gulfport, Mississippi, where
police officers arrested him on November 3, 1989.16
At the time of his arrest, Stinson possessed three inactive hand
grenades, ammunition, numerous components for the construction
of bombs, a semi-automatic pistol, a stun gun, a sawed-off shotgun,
and knives. 17 Stinson later pleaded guilty to a five count indictment
charging him with bank robbery, felon in possession of a weapon, 8
and three other violations.' 9 The district court sentenced him under
the career offender guidelines, 20 finding that he met the three essential
elements of the career offender provisions: (1) he was at least eighteen
years old at the time of the offense; (2) he was convicted of a
felony which was either a crime of violence or involved a controlled
substance; and (3) he had at least two prior felony convictions which
had involved either a crime of violence or a controlled substance. 2'
The district court sentenced Stinson to a prison term of 365 months
in addition to a mandatory five year term for using a firearm during
the commission of a crime of violence. 22
Under the career offender guidelines, 23 the offense level is de-
termined by the statutory maximum of the crime of conviction. 24
Since conviction of the possession of a firearm offense with which
13. Id. However, there was no explosion because the grenade was inactive. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. He stole the van after asking the salesman if he could test drive it.
During the test drive, Stinson pulled a gun on the salesman and took him to his
(Stinson's) apartment, where he bound the salesman with rope and handcuffs and
confined him in a closet. Before leaving, Stinson warned the salesman that the
closet door was rigged with a bomb which would explode if opened. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id.; United States v. Stinson, 943 F.2d 1268, 1269 (11th Cir. 1991).
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). A person who possesses a firearm and
has three prior convictions for crimes of violence or drug offenses is subject to a
statutory sentence of not less than fifteen years to life. Id.
19. Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1269. The offenses were use of a firearm during a
crime of violence, violation of weapon registration laws, and transportation of
stolen property in interstate commerce. Id.
20. U.S.S.G. §§ 4BI.1-4B1.4.
21. Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1270.
22. Id. at 1269.
23. U.S.S.G. § 4BI.I.
24. Id.
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Stinson was charged carries a maximum sentence of life in prison,2"
the offense level is thirty-seven.1 The district court could have used
Stinson's conviction on the armed robbery charge as the predicate
offense. However, since the maximum sentence for armed robbery
is twenty-five years, 27 the offense level would have been thirty-two. 2
The government therefore urged the court to use Stinson's conviction
of the possession of a firearm charge to increase Stinson's sentencing
range. 2
9
On appeal, Stinson argued that possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon does not constitute a "crime of violence" under the
career offender provision of the guidelines. 0 In its analysis, the
Eleventh Circuit examined the definition of "crime of violence" as
found in the guidelines.3 Concluding that possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon poses a "serious potential risk of injury to
another,' '32 the court held that it constituted a "crime of violence"
and affirmed the enhancement of Stinson's sentence."
Less than one month after the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the
Commission amended the commentary to guideline § 4B1.2.34 The
amendment stated that "[t]he term 'crime of violence' does not
include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon." 3
Based on this amendment, Stinson petitioned the Eleventh Circuit
25. See supra note 18.
26. U.S.S.G. § 4BI.I.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1988).
28. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.l. It should be noted that Stinson's base offense level was
reduced by two levels for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3EI.I.
Respondent's Brief at 4.
29. Telephone Interview with Ronald T. Henry, Assistant United States Attorney
for the Middle District of Florida (Sept. 16, 1993). The sentencing range for an
offense level of thirty and a criminal history category of VI is 168 to 210 months
in prison. The sentencing range for an offense level of thirty-five and a criminal
history category of VI is 292 to 365 months. U.S.S.G. § 5A. It is interesting to
note that had the district court used Stinson's conviction on the armed robbery
charge as the requisite "crime of violence," the amended commentary and the
Supreme Court's analysis of it would have been unnecessary.
30. Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1270.
31. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. This section defines "crime of violence" as any offense,
under federal or state law, which is punishable by more than one year in prison
and either: (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against another; or (2) is a burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,
involves the use of explosives, or in some other way involves conduct which presents
a serious potential risk of injury to another. Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1270.
32. Stinson, 943 F.2d at 1270.
33. Id. at 1273.
34. Respondent's Brief at 6.
35. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. 2.
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for a rehearing, arguing that the amendment was retroactive and
applicable to his sentence.36
The Eleventh Circuit defended its previous holding that pos-
session of a firearm by a convicted felon is "categorically a 'crime
of violence' "7 by citing to other circuits which had reached the
same conclusion.3 8 The court then analyzed the authoritative weight
of commentary. 9 Referring to the guidelines section that explains
the significance of commentary, 40 the court noted that the com-
mentary to that section provided that "courts will treat the com-
mentary much like legislative history . . . . ",4' The court stated that
§ 4B1.2 did not clearly define "crime of violence" and looked to
the commentary to clarify the meaning. 42
After concluding that the authoritative weight of commentary
was equal to that of legislative history, the Eleventh Circuit scru-
tinized the process by which the Commission promulgates guidelines
and amendments. 43 Noting that the amendments to commentary are
not reviewed by Congress," the court rejected the argument that
commentary is binding authority and refused to be bound by the
amendment unless Congress amended the test of § 4B1.2 to exclude
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a "crime of vio-
lence." '45 Stinson appealed to the United States Supreme Court which
vacated the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit and held that commentary to the guidelines is
binding.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Guidelines Sentencing
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("Act")," criminals
in the federal system were sentenced according to a system of
36. United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 814 (11th Cir. 1992).
37. Id.
38. See United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d
696 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1989).
39. Stinson, 957 F.2d at 814.
40. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7.
41. Id.; see infra note 120.
42. Stinson, 957 F.2d at 814.
43. Id. at 815.
44. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
45. Stinson, 957 F.2d at 815.
46. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
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indeterminate sentencing. 47 Under this framework, a "three-way
sharing" of sentencing responsibilities existed:48 Congress passed
-criminal statutes which set a maximum term of imprisonment for
offenders; judges decided what sentence to impose;49 and the parole
board, an agency within the Executive Branch,50 subsequently
determined the actual sentence an offender would serve.5 As a result,
wide disparities existed, with similar offenders serving vastly different
amounts of time,5 2 depending on the particular sentencing judge"
and the decisions made by the parole board.5 4 Consequently,
47. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989); Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685 (1992); Maureen Juran, The Tenth Circuit's
Approach to the Constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 DENv.
U. L. REV. 545, 546 (1990); Julia Kazaks et al., Project, Twenty-Second Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 1423 n.2207 (1993). A concept known as "coercive
rehabilitation" provided the underlying justification for the system of indeterminate
sentencing. According to this concept, release from prison was tied to the completion
of various types of vocational, educational, and counseling programs within the
prison. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37-50 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3182, 3223.
48. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
49. Freed, supra note 47, at 1687-88.
50. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233,
§ 2, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4202).
51. At that time, an offender was eligible for parole after serving one-third of
the sentence. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98
Stat.) at 3223. Additionally, the parole board set a release date if it concluded
that the offender had been rehabilitated. Id.
52. In 1974, the average sentence throughout the federal system for bank robbery
was 11 years, yet the average sentence in the Northern District of Illinois was only
5 1/2 years. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3182, 3224. Similarly, a study reported
in 1973 showed that the average length of sentences for forgery ranged from 30
months in the Third Circuit to 82 months in the District of Columbia. Id. at 3224
n.21. For interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, the same study revealed a
range of sentences averaging from 22 months in the First Circuit to 42 months in
the Tenth Circuit. Id.
53. One commentator has suggested that in some instances, judges imposed
sentences based upon the offender's race, sex, or social class. Ilene N. Nagel,
Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990). However, the legislative history of the
Act suggests that some of the disparity can also be attributed to the varying opinions
of judges as to the true purposes of sentencing. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3224 n.18. For example, one judge
may have imposed a sizeable prison term in order to incapacitate an offender,
whereas another judge may have chosen to impose a period of probation in order
to rehabilitate him. Id. at 3224.
54. According to the Supreme Court's decision in Mistretta, the rationale behind
parole was that it was actually possible to rehabilitate the offender, thus reducing
the likelihood that he or she would revert to criminal activity upon returning to
[Vol. 17:155
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complaints arose regarding the ineffectiveness of the sentencing
system, 5 and rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing began to be
questioned.16 Congress therefore was forced to- search for new methods
of dealing with the sentencing of criminals.57
B. Post-Guidelines Sentencing
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,58 Congress devised
a new multipart plan in an effort to deal with the problems of the
society. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. Therefore, once the parole board determined
that an offender had been rehabilitated, it exercised its discretion to shorten the
offender's sentence and released him on parole. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3221.
In order to make parole more predictable, the Parole Commission implemented
its own guidelines in the early 1970s. Freed, supra note 47, at 1688 n.26. By doing
so, the Commission had two goals: (1) to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentences
by using the guidelines to recommend appropriate sentences for different offenses
and offender characteristics, and (2) to increase certainty in prison release dates
by setting a "presumptive release date." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3229. However, in the eyes of the Senate
Judiciary Committee ("Committee"), this split of authority between judges and
the Parole Commission instead increased disparity and uncertainty due to the massive
amount of discretion vested in both the Parole Commission and in the judicial
branch. Id. In addition, the disparity and uncertainty also increased because some
judges imposed sentences with an eye toward what action the parole board might
eventually take. Id.; see also Freed, supra note 47, at 1688 (explaining that "some
judges tried to anticipate parole when formulating a sentence").
55. Nagel, supra note 53, at 884.
56. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365. In the view of the Committee, two major
problems surrounded the concept of rehabilitation: (1) it was doubtful that re-
habilitation could occur in a prison environment, and (2) it was difficult for anyone
to tell whether or when an offender had been rehabilitated. S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3221.
57. Prior to the final decision of whether to implement the Sentencing Guidelines,
Congress contemplated two other options. One possibility was a strict determinate
sentencing system in which judges would be forced to consider a series of alternative
sentences prior to sentencing the individual. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; see also
S. REp. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at
3261. However, the Committee discarded this option because it believed that the
Sentencing Guidelines would succeed in reducing unwanted disparity, while preserving
flexibility to adjust individual sentences in light of unanticipated factors in individual
cases. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3261.
The Committee also rejected a proposal which'would have made the Sentencing
Guidelines advisory but not mandatory. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; see also S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3261.
The Committee based its rejection on the results of a report by the National
Academy of Science which showed poor results in those states which experimented
with a voluntary system. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3262. One witness before the Committee testified that
judges in Massachusetts generally failed to follow the guidelines. S. REp. No. 225,
supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3262.
58. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
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previous system. 9 The first part of the plan eliminated parole and
abolished the United States Parole Commission6 in order to reduce
uncertainty regarding the actual amount of time an offender would
serve .
6
The second part of the new plan gave federal judges the power
to set a determinate sentence that an offender would have to serve
in full 62 except for any discount awarded for good behavior.6 3 In
addition, the judges were to impose a period of supervised release
that offenders would serve upon release from prison. 64 Under this
part, the judge would be required to impose a sentence within the
applicable range of the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.6 5
In deciding upon a particular sentence, the judge must consider
numerous factors, 66 such as the nature and circumstances of the
offense, 67 the history and characteristics of the defendant, 68 the goals
of sentencing, 69 and the kinds of sentences available.70
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
59. A significant aspect of this new plan was the rejection of the theory that
rehabilitation is a central goal of imprisonment. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988).
Instead, the new system was designed to ensure that punishment serves retributive,
educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
60. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a), 98 Stat.
2027; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; Freed, supra note 47, at 1689.
61. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.)
at 3222; Freed; supra note 47, at 1689.
62. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; Freed, supra note 47, at 1689.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
64. Id. § 3624(e).
65. Id. § 3553(a)(4), (b). One poll revealed that in fiscal year 1990, 83.3% of
the defendants sentenced under the guidelines received "within-guidelines" sentences.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (1991).
However, in order to preserve the desired flexibility in sentencing, S. REP. No.
225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3261, Congress
has allowed judges to depart from the guidelines in cases where a factor exists
which was not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission and which
should result in a different sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). Nonetheless, in
making this determination, Congress has instructed the courts to consider only the
sentencing guidelines, the policy statements, and the official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission. Id. Some downward departure factors which were upheld
by appellate courts between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 1992 include a
defendant's diminished capacity, extraordinary postoffense restitution, and postof-
fense drug rehabilitation. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 3 (1992).
Downward departure factors that were not approved by appellate courts include
a defendant's suicidal tendencies, health, mental and emotional condition, and
employment record. Id. at tbl. 4.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
67. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
68. Id.
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The third aspect of the new system established the review of
sentences by the courts of appeals. 71 This marked a clear departure
from the previous method of sentencing in which sentences ordinarily
were not appealable to the courts of appeals, 72 but instead were
reviewed by the parole boards. 73 Under the new system, however,
either the defendant or the government can appeal a sentence.
74
The fourth component of the plan established the United States
Sentencing Commission. 75 The purposes of the Commission are: (1)
to establish sentencing policies and practices for use in the federal
system7 6 and (2) to develop a system of determining the extent to
which the guidelines are fulfilling the sentencing purposes expressed
by Congress.77
1. Structure of the Commission
a. Composition
The Commission is composed of seven voting members and one
permanent nonvoting member.78 Each of the voting members serve
69. Id. § 3553(a)(2); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (1988); Id. § 3551(b).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368; Freed, supra note 47,
at 1689-90.
72. Under the prior system, two statutes allowed for review of sentences: 18
U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) (pertaining to dangerous special offenders) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 849 (1976) (relating to dangerous drug offenders). S. REP. No. 225, supra note
47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3221 n.7.
73. Freed, supra note 47, at 1689-90. In addition, under the previous system,
decisions of the parole board were generally reviewable only to determine whether
the board had abused its discretion. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) at 3221 n.7.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b) (1988). These subsections provide that the gov-
ernment may appeal if the sentencing judge departs below the guideline sentencing
range. Similarly, the defendant may appeal if the departure is above the guideline
range. In addition, either party may appeal if the guidelines have been misapplied.
Id.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The Commission is located within the judicial
branch, yet serves as an independent commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988);
Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal,
36 UCLA L. REv. 83, 98 (1988).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1), (2) (1988).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), (b)(2) (1988). For purposes of sentencing under
the guidelines, see supra note 59.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The permanent nonvoting member is either the
Attorney General of the United States or her designee. Id. In addition, under 18
U.S.C. § 3551 (1988), the chairman of the U.S. Parole Commission also served
as a temporary ex-officio nonvoting member until the Parole Commission disbanded
in 1992. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98
Stat.) at 3343; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 369 n.4.
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six year terms,79 and no voting member may serve more than two
full terms.8 0 With the advice and consent of the Senate,8' the President
appoints each of the voting members after consultation with judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and others having an interest in the
criminal justice system.82 Additionally, in order to keep appointments
to the Commission from being based on politics, no more than four
Commission members can come from the same political party.83
b. Responsibilities
The primary responsibility of the Commission is the promulgation
and distribution of guidelines84 and policy statements 85 to all courts
of the United States and to the United States Probation System.
The Commission is also charged with promulgating and distributing
guidelines or general policy statements regarding revocation of
probation, 6 modification of the length or conditions of supervised
release,8 7 and revocation of supervised release. 8
Another major responsibility of the Commission is the frequent
review and revision of the guidelines.8 9 To accomplish this task,
Congress mandated that the Commission consult with authorities
within the criminal justice system.9 In addition, each year the
79. 28 U.S.C. § 992(a) (1988). However, the members of the Commission are
subject to removal by the President, but only for neglect of duty, malfeasance in
office, or other good cause. Id. § 991(a).
80. 28 US.C. § 992(b) (1988).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). In addition, the President, upon advice and
consent of the Senate, 'appoints one of the members to serve as chairman of the
Commission. Id.
82. Id.
83. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.)
at 3343; 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1988). In promulgating guidelines, the Commission
is charged with providing information to assist judges in imposing sentences, such
as whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or fine; whether the
amount of the fine or length of imprisonment or probation is appropriate; whether
a period of supervised release is necessary; and whether multiple sentences should
run concurrently or consecutively. Id. In addition, the Commission was charged
with establishing guideline ranges consistent with the provisions of Title 18 of the
United States Code. Id. § 994(b)(1).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (1988).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1988).
87. Id. § 3583(e).
88. Id.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (1988).
90. Id. Groups with which the Commission is to consult include representatives
from the U.S. Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial Conference
of the United States, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and the
Federal Defenders System. Such interaction was designed to allow the Commission
to "fine-tune" the guidelines in order to respond to emerging problems. Freed,
supra note 47, at 1694.
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Commission must review presentence reports, guideline worksheets,
sentencing statements issued by judges, and plea agreements from
numerous sentences. 9' The Commission then may promulgate
amendments to the guidelines to implement any suggestions or
improvements. Proposed amendments must be submitted to Congress
for review.92 The amendments go into effect either at a date specified
by the Commission or after six months have passed from the date
of submission. 93 However, these restrictions apply only to the
guidelines,9 thus leaving the door open for the amendment of
commentary without Congressional review. 95
c. Procedures
The Commission promulgates guidelines and policy statements
by an affirmative vote of at least four of its members.9 In establishing
the guidelines, the Commission constructed a sentencing range from
which sentencing judges must choose the particular punishment an
offender will receive. 9 Furthermore, in setting up this sentencing
scheme, Congress instructed the Commission to consider two distinct
categories: (1) categories of offenses" and (2) categories of offenders.10
91. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 369-70.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988). Such amendments must be made, if at all, either
at the beginning of a regular session of Congress or anytime before May 1. Id.
In submitting an amendment, the CommisSion must also attach a statement of
reasons for the modification. Id.
93. Id. The amendment cannot go into effect after November 1 of the year in
which it was submitted unless the effective date is revised or the amendment is
otherwise altered or disapproved by Congress. Id.
94. Id. § 994(a), (p).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 165-78.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
97. Id. A separate sentencing range exists for each category of offense involving
each category of defendant, and all sentencing ranges must comply with each of
the pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1)
(1988). Furthermore, the maximum range of imprisonment cannot exceed the min-
imum of that range by more than the greater of either 25% or six months, unless
the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, in which case the maximum
term of such range can be life imprisonment. Id. § 994(b)(2).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). However, a sentencing judge can depart either
upward or downward from the guidelines. See supra note 65.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (1988). The Commission must consider seven different
factors when establishing the category of offenses: (1) the grade of the offense;
(2) any aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense; (3) the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense; (4) the community
view of the offense; (5) the public concern over the offense; (6) the deterrent effect
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The end result of these efforts is the sentencing table, which blends
the categories of offenses with the categories of offenders to produce
a grid composed of forty-three levels and six criminal history
categories. 0
2. Structure of the Guidelines Manual
Currently, the guidelines are set forth in a manual consisting
of 371 pages. 0 2 Within the guidelines manual there are three kinds
of text: the guidelines, policy statements, and commentary. 03
a. The Guidelines
The guidelines were designed to direct the courts in determining
the nature and length of sentences to be imposed in criminal cases.1°1
Accordingly, they provide step-by-step instructions to aid courts in
determining sentencing ranges. 05 The guidelines are binding on
sentencing judges, 0 6 and the Supreme Court has upheld their
constitutionality. 107
b. The Policy Statements
Policy statements are a second type of text within the Guidelines
Manual.' ° As stated previously, the Commission is responsible for
promulgating policy statements which pertain to the application of
guidelines or any other facet of sentencing that would advance the
sentencing goals found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).109 Though originally
of a particular sentence; and (7) other incidences of the offense at both the national
and local levels. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988). Congress also charged the Commission with
considering the relevance of other factors such as the defendant's age, education.
family ties and responsibilities, community ties, and criminal history. Id. However,
Congress required the Commission to consider these factors only to the extent that
they are relevant. Id.
101. U.S.S.G., pt. A, § (4)(h). In order to reduce unnecessary litigation, the
ranges for each level overlap with those in the preceding and succeeding levels.
Id.
102. U.S.S.G. In addition, a separate appendix contains over 350 pages of
amendments to the guidelines. U.S.S.G. at app. C.
103. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1988).
105. U.S.S.G. § IBI.1.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (b) (1988).
107. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391.
108. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (1988); see discussion supra note 59.
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meant to be nonbinding,"0 the policy statements are also binding
on federal judges."'
c. The Commentary
The third type of text in the Guidelines Manual is commentary." 2
Although the Sentencing Reform Act did not specifically authorize
the promulgation of commentary, one of the statutory directives to
sentencing courts refers to it.' The Guidelines Manual states that
commentary may serve three possible functions:" 4 (1) to interpret
a guideline or explain how to apply it;'" (2) to suggest instances in
which departure from the guidelines may be warranted;" 6 and (3)
to provide background information regarding the guidelines, including
the reasons for the promulgation of particular guidelines." 7 Prior
to the Supreme Court's holding in Stinson, courts differed as to
the authoritative weight of commentary." 8 However, beginning with
the decision in Williams v. United States"9 and ending with its
110. Several passages within the guidelines manual indicate that the policy state-
ments were originally intended to be nonbinding. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7 (stating
that commentary and policy statements merely provide guidance for courts con-
sidering departures); U.S.S.G. § 1BI.7 commentary (indicating that portions of the
guidelines manual not labeled as either guidelines or commentary should be inter-
preted as commentary and have the force of policy statements); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10
commentary (stating that § IBI.10 is a policy statement which provides guidance
for courts considering a reduction in sentence). The Supreme Court also discussed
the nature of policy statements in Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1125
(1992) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "Je]ven though policy statements are
numbered and grouped in the Guidelines Manual by means identical to actual
guidelines ... their purpose is limited to interpreting and explaining how to apply
the guidelines, and-significantly-'may provide guidance in assessing the reason-
ableness of any departure from the guidelines' ").
111. Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992).
112. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917. This statute directs
a court, when considering a departure from the guidelines, to consider only the
guideline provisions, the policy statements, and the official commentary of the
Sentencing Commission. See supra note 65.
114. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7.
115. Failure to follow the commentary may constitute an incorrect application
of the guidelines, thus increasing the possibility of reversal on appeal. See 18
U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
116. In this event, the commentary is to be given the legal equivalence of a
policy statement. See supra note 110.
117. U.S.S.G. § 1BI.7.
118. See generally United States v. Wimbish, 980 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smeathers,
884 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1989).
119. Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992).
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decision in Stinson, the Supreme Court has essentially abolished any
distinction among the guidelines, policy statements, and commentary
because all three parts are equally binding on the courts.
In attempting to explain the nature and authoritative weight of
commentary, different sources have made numerous analogies. First,
the Sentencing Commission compared the commentary to legislative
history. 2 Under the rules of statutory construction, courts generally
look first to the language of the statute.' 2' However, if that language
is unclear, courts must then look to the legislative history of the
statute.1'2 If commentary were considered analogous to legislative
history, courts would look first at the language of the pertinent
guideline and resort to the commentary only when the guideline
itself is unclear.
A second analogy advanced is that commentary is similar to
an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute that it
administers. 23 Under this rule of construction, courts must defer to
the agency's interpretation if the statute is ambiguous and if the
interpretation is "a permissible construction of the statute."'' 24 If
the statute is unambiguous, the language of the statute prevails. 25
Applying this analogy to commentary, courts would defer to the
commentary if a particular guideline were unclear regarding a specific
point and the commentary provided a logical explanation. However,
120. U.S.S.G'. § IBI.7 commentary. Discussing the role of commentary, the
Commission states that in seeking guidance as to the intent of the Commission in
drafting a particular guideline, "the courts will treat the commentary much like
legislative history or other legal material that helps determine the intent of the
drafter." Id.
121. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); see also Illinois EPA v. United
States EPA, 947 F.2d 283, 289 (7th Cir. 1991); Richards Medical Co. v. United
States, 910 F.2d 828, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 (9th
Cir. 1988). See generally REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
OF STATUTES 139 (1975); NoRmAN j. SIONER, Su r LAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 1 (5th ed. 1992).
122. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896; see also Stupy v. United States Postal Serv., 951
F.2d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 1991); Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d
522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
123. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1918; accord United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844,
855 (3d Cir. 1992); Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding v. Sowell, 933 F.2d 1561,
1567 (11th Cir. 1991); see also DICKERSON, supra note 121, at 162; SINGER, supra
note 121, at 5.
124. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984); see also Illinois EPA, 947 F.2d at 289; Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock v. Howard, 904 F.2d 206, 209 (4th Cir. 1990); Lever Bros. Co. v.
United States, 877 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Generally, the function of regulations is to
help implement or execute related statutes. STATSKY, supra note 1, at 2. However,
regulations which go beyond the authority of the statute are invalid. STATSKY,
supra note 1, at 2.
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a court would be required to adhere to the text of the guideline if
its language was unambiguous.
Third, the commentary also has been compared to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. 126 The agency's interpretation
normally is allowed to control as long as the interpretation does
not violate the Constitution or a federal statute. Further, the agency's
interpretation prevails unless it is clearly erroneous or incompatible
with the regulation it interprets.127 Under this analogy, the Commission
would be comparable to an administrative agency which promulgates
its own regulations (guidelines) and interprets them via the
commentary. Consequently, the commentary would prevail as long
as it: (1) is not a clearly erroneous interpretation of a guideline;
(2) does not conflict with the guideline it interprets; and (3) does
not violate the Constitution or a federal statute.
Thus, to resolve conflicting views among the circuits as to the
nature of commentary, the Supreme Court had to decide which, if
any, of these analogies pertained to the guidelines.
IV. ANALYsis
In vacating the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court effectively equated commentary with an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations by holding that commentary to the guidelines
is binding on sentencing courts unless: (1) it violates the Constitution
or a federal statute or (2) it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the guideline it interprets. 28
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the role of the
Sentencing Commission in establishing policies and procedures for
sentencing in the federal criminal justice system. 29 The Court noted
the three types of text in the guidelines and the function of each. 30
The Court next discussed the weight of each of these three
parts. The guidelines, the Court observed, bind judges as they carry
out their responsibility of sentencing in criminal cases.' 3 ' The Court
stated that unless certain circumstances exist, 32 the sentencing court
must sentence an offender to a term within the applicable guideline
range as provided by Congress. Similarly, the Court continued,
126. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919.
127. Id.; see Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
128. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1915.
129. Id. at 1916; 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l) (1988).
130. See supra text accompanying note 103.
131. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917 (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391).
132. See supra note 65.
133. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917.
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policy statements also are binding on sentencing courts and are
authoritative in determining the meaning of applicable guidelines. 34
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit was in
error when that court rejected these principles as applicable to
commentary. 3 '
In its examination of the role of commentary, the Court stated
that the amended commentary interpreted § 4BI.2 and explained the
meaning of "crime of violence.' ' 3 6 As a result, the Court concluded
that commentary, which interprets a guideline or explains how to
apply it, is. controlling. 1 7 Furthermore, the Court stated that failing
to follow the commentary could result in an incorrect application
of the guidelines. 13 The Court then expanded the holding of Williams 39
to include commentary. 140
In its analysis, the Court focused on the various comparisons
that had been made regarding the authoritative weight of commen-
tary. The Court discussed and rejected the analogy comparing com-
mentary to legislative history and advisory committee notes.' 4' The
Court observed that, unlike legislative history or advisory notes,
commentary is issued long after the guideline it interprets. 42 Fur-
thermore, because the guidelines cannot become effective until the
six month review period has passed, 43 the Court stated that an-
nouncing the initial intent behind a guideline long after it has already
taken effect would be inconsistent with the entire review process.'"4
In addition, the Court added that there is nothing in the guidelines
134. Id. (citing Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1119 (1992)). In
Williams, the district court departed upward due to the defendant's prior arrests,
even though they did not result in criminal convictions. Williams, 112 .S. Ct. at
1117. However, a policy statement to § 4AI.3 stated that a court could not base
a departure on prior arrests alone. Id. As a result, the Supreme Court held that
failure to follow a policy statement renders a sentence an incorrect application of
the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (1988), and thus subject to reversal on
appeal. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1119-21.
135. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1917-18. The Court also pointed to the guidelines themselves, which
state that failure to follow the commentary could result in reversal on appeal. Id.
at 1918; see also U.S.S.G. § IB1.7.
138. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1917-18.
139. See supra note 110.
140. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1918.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying note 93.
144. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1918.
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or in the Act to indicate whether the weight of commentary hinges
on it being issued contemporaneously with or subsequent to the
guideline.' 4
5
The Court then rejected the analogy comparing commentary to
an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers.' 4 ' The Court
found that while a legislative rule stems from the delegated authority
for rulemaking, commentary has a different function: to explain the
guidelines and show how to apply them in practice. 47 However, the
Court held that commentary is analogous to an agency's interpre-
tation of its own regulations.'" Like an agency's promulgation of
regulations, the Commission promulgates guidelines via the delegation
of authority by Congress for rulemaking. 49 As a result, the Court
held that commentary assists in the interpretation of guidelines that
are within its area of expertise50 and thus should be given equal
weight with the interpretations by agencies of their regulations.' 5'
Explaining its holding, the Court stated that such binding au-
thority is consistent with the scope and intent of the Sentencing
Reform Act. 52 The Court reasoned that the Commission not only
promulgates guidelines and commentary, but also periodically reviews
and revises both after consultation with various authorities in the
federal criminal justice system.'53 To accomplish this, the Court
explained, the Commission must be able to amend not only the
guidelines, but also the commentary.'1 Consequently, the Court held
that commentary is binding on the federal courts, and prior judicial
decisions which conflict with it will not prevail.'55
Confronted with the guidelines' position that the weight of
commentary is equal to that of legislative history,5 6 the Court dis-
145. Id.
146. Id.; see Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that the statute governs if it is not ambiguous; otherwise,
courts must defer to an interpretation as long as it is "a permissible construction
of the statute").
147. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1918.
148. Id. at 1918-19.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 127.
152. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1916 n.l (noting that the amendment was contrary
to the holdings of seven circuits).
156. U.S.S.G. § IBI.7.
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missed as "ironic" the Commission's views of how courts would
treat commentary.5 7 Instead, the Court focused on the language of
§ IBI.7, which states that failure to follow the commentary could
result in reversible error. 58
Finally, applying its reasoning to the facts in Stinson, the Court
observed that the exclusion of the felon-in-possession offense from
the meaning of "crime of violence" could not be derived from the
text of the guideline itself.5 9 The Court concluded that the amend-
ment to the commentary was a binding interpretation of "crime of
violence" because it neither violated the Constitution nor a federal
statute and was not inconsistent with § 4B1.2.160
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to address the
Government's contention that the amendment should not be given
retroactive effect. 6' The Eleventh Circuit did not consider this ar-
gument in its opinion, and thus the Court did not certify it as a
part of the question formulated in the grant of certiorari. 6 2 The
Supreme Court subsequently vacated Stinson's sentence and re-
manded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for resentencing and a
determination whether amendments to commentary are retroactive. 63
V. SIGNIFICANCE
At first glance, it may appear that the Supreme Court's holding
has little significance, if any. However, a closer examination of the
guidelines and commentary illustrates that this holding increased the
power of the United States Sentencing Commission tremendously,
perhaps even further than Congress originally intended. Furthermore,
even though the Supreme Court did not rule on the issue of ret-
roactivity, the decision regarding which amendments will be retro-
active also appears to be within the complete discretion of the
Commission.'"
157. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1919-20. In U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7, the Commission stated
that courts likely would look to the commentary for insight as to the intent of
the Commission and would thus treat commentary similar to legislative history.
U.S.S.G. § IBI.7 commentary.
158. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1920.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. On remand the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the
amendment was retroactive since it clarified that "the offense of unlawful possession
of a weapon is not a crime of violence." United States v. Stinson, 30 F.3d 121,
122 (11th Cir. 1994).
164. See U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.10.
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A. The Increased Power of the United States Sentencing
Commission
As discussed earlier, any amendments to the guidelines must
undergo a six month review period by Congress before they are
enacted. 165 However, the commentary is not subject to Congressional
review.' 66 Applying the Court's holding in Stinson, it will be possible
for the United States Sentencing Commission to effectively change
the guidelines by amending the commentary, thus avoiding
Congressional review. Though such a possibility may seem farfetched,
at least one significant change has already been accomplished by
the Commission through a change in the commentary. Succinctly,
the Commission altered the effective sentencing range for certain
drug offenses by amending the commentary. The amended commentary
later provided the justification for an amendment to the guideline.
The sentencing range for drug offenses is primarily determined
by the quantity of drugs involved. To assist with determining a
single offense level, the Commission promulgated drug equivalency
tables that are used to equate less common substances with more
common types of controlled substances. 67 These tables appear in
the commentary to the guidelines.
In 1989, the drug equivalency tables provided that one gram
of methamphetamine (also known as "crank", "crystal", or "speed")
was equal to one gram of heroin or five grams of cocaine.'6 However,
in 1990 the Commission decided to distinguish between
methamphetamine which is mixed with other substances and pure
methamphetamine. 69 They did so by changing the commentary to
provide tougher sentences for offenses involving purer substances.
Thus, one gram of a mixture of substances containing
methamphetamine was still equal to one gram of heroin.' 70 However,
one gram of pure methamphetamine became equivalent to ten grams
of mixed methamphetamine. '7' This change was not subject to
Congressional review.
165. See supra text accompanying note 93.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
167. U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I commentary, application note 10. For example, assume
that a defendant is convicted of possessing one gram of heroin. Under the drug
equivalency tables, one gram of heroin is equivalent to one kilogram of marijuana.
Id. Thus, the base offense level for possession of one gram of heroin and one
kilogram of marijuana is the same-level ten. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c).
168. U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I commentary, application note 10.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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In 1991, the Commission amended the guidelines to reflect the
change in the commentary by including the formula for determining
the actual (pure) amount of controlled substance.7 2 In making this
change, the Commission stated that it was simply clarifying what
it meant in prior years regarding the equivalence of various controlled
substances. 7 In reality, the Commission elevated the offense levels
for all methamphetamine cases when purity is greater than ten
percent.74 For example, under the 1989 guidelines, one gram of
methamphetamine was equal to one gram of heroin or five grams
of cocaine. 75 Thus, in 1989, if a defendant was convicted of possessing
five grams of methamphetamine, his base offense level would have
been fourteen. 76 Assuming that the defendant's criminal history
category was I, the defendant's sentencing range would have been
between fifteen and twenty-one months. 77
Under the 1990 guidelines, however, the result would have been
drastically different depending upon the purity of the substance; if
the defendant was convicted of possessing five grams of pure
methamphetamine, his base offense level would have been twenty. 78
Assuming once again that the defendant's criminal history category
172. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c). The formula is the weight of the mixture multiplied
by the purity of the mixture. Id. The Commission illustrated the formula by using
an example involving PCP. For example, a mixture weighing ten grams and con-
taining PCP at fifty percent purity contains five grams of PCP. Id. Of lesser
importance, the Commission also changed the measuring stick to which other
substances are to be compared from heroin to marijuana. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 com-
mentary, note 10.
173. U.S.S.G. app. C, at 225.
174. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 commentary, application note 9. According to some pro-
secutors, the purity of methamphetamine is typically between thirty-eight and fifty
percent. Telephone Interview with Robert J. Govar, Senior Litigation Counsel,
United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Arkansas (Sept. 17,
1993).
The Commission explained that t1"c purity of a substance is indicative of the
defendant's involvement in the chain of distribution, because controlled substances
are often mixed with other substances as they pass from one person to another.
Id. Thus, the Commission concluded that high levels of purity may indicate that
a defendant plays a primary role in a drug enterprise and may be in close proximity
to the supplier. Id. However, the "role in the offense," that is, proximity to the
source, is already accounted for in § 3BI. and § 3B1.2, which provide for an
increase or decrease by as much as four levels in a defendant's base offense level,
pursuant to his role in the offense.
175. See supra text accompanying note 168. Under the 1989 guidelines, there is
no distinction between pure methamphetamine and a mixture containing meth-
amphetamine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 commentary, application note 10.
176. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.l(c).
177. U.S.S.G. § 5A.
178. U.S.S.G. § 2DI.I commentary, application note 10.
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was I, his sentence would range from thirty-three to forty-one months,
or more than double what it was under the 1989 guidelines.
Clearly, this change is substantial. Though it occurred before
the Supreme Court's decision in Stinson, it is now binding on courts
since the equivalency tables are within the commentary. Thus, the
Commission has, in the wake of Stinson, clear power to alter the
applicable punishment of offenders without Congressional oversight.
Such a system therefore could allow the Commission to determine
which standards will be reviewed by Congress by designating them
as either amendments to the guidelines or as amendments to the
commentary.
B. The Question of Retroactivity
At the end of its opinion, the Supreme Court left for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit the question of
whether the amended commentary at issue in Stinson should be
applied retroactively. 79 However, regardless of the Eleventh Circuit's
holding on remand, the issue of retroactivity had already been decided
since the Commission determines which amendments will be
retroactive. '80
In sentencing a defendant, the sentencing court must apply the
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.' 8 ' By statute, after the
sentence is imposed, the defendant may seek a modification of his
sentence if a reduction in his sentence is consistent with the applicable
policy statements issued by the Commission.'8 2 The Commission has
addressed this issue in § 1B1.10, a policy statement that lists the
amendments to guidelines which it considers to be eligible for
retroactive application.' 3 Under the present guidelines, the amended
179. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1920; see supra note 163.
180. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1o.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1988). This statute provides that:
[In the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion
of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own
motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering
the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission.
Id. Factors considered by the Commission in determining which amendments will
be retroactive include the purpose of the amendment, the magnitude of the impact
on the guideline range as a result of the amendment, and the difficulty of applying
the amendment retroactively. U.S.S.G. § IBl.10 commentary.
183. U.S.S.G. § IBl.1O commentary (policy statement).
1994]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
commentary at issue in Stinson (Amendment 433) is specifically
identified as being retroactive.'" Furthermore, even though the text
which provides for retroactivity is a policy statement, 8 1 it is still
binding. 6
Curiously, one amendment which operates to reduce a defendant's
base offense level pursuant to acceptance of responsibility has not
been determined to be retroactive by the Commission, 87 and courts
have thus yielded to the Commission's determination.8 Such adherence
provides an example of the extent to which the Commission's power
has increased.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, the Commission has enormous power in de-
termining how offenders are punished in our federal criminal justice
system, and much of that power appears to have been intended by
Congress when it created the sentencing guidelines system. The Su-
preme Court observed in Mistretta that "the Commission is fully
accountable to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of
the Guidelines as it sees fit . . .189 However, with the Supreme
Court's holding in Stinson, the Commission's accountability to Con-
gress may be more ephemeral than real, and the truth of Bishop
Hoadley's observation may be more realistic than ever.
Todd L. Newton*
184. U.S.S.G. § 1BI.10 commentary (policy statement). The Supreme Court noted
this in Stinson. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. at 1920.
185. U.S.S.G. § IBL.1O commentary (policy statement).
186. This result follows from the application of the Court's holding in Williams
that policy statements are' binding on federal courts. See also Stin'o, 113 S. Ct.
at 1917.
187. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.l(a). Under this section, a defendant's base offense level
can be reduced by two levels if the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.. . ." Id. This section was amended to add an
additional one level reduction if a defendant assists the authorities in the investigation
or prosecution of his offense. U.S.S.G. app. C (amend. 459).
188. See generally DeSouza v. United States, 995 F.2d 323, 324 (1st Cir. 1993);
United States v. Caceda, 990 F.2d 707, 710 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Soffos,
993 F.2d 1541 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished per curiam); United States v. Dowty,
996 F.2d 937, 939 (8th Cir. 1993).
189. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 666.
* The author would like to acknowledge Michael D. Johnson, First Assistant
United States Attorney/Criminal Chief, for his insight during the preparation of
this note.
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